Is the VPF contribution tax-free?

29th meeting on October 24th, 2019 - Lucrative spy services

At a late hour, Martina Renner takes the opportunity to question a V-man guide and points out problems with the V-man being.

Martina Renner (left) already knows what a spy earns for the police and the protection of the constitution from her experience with the NSU committees. “So get around 200 euros tax-free at twelve meetings?” Renner calculates. Witness VPF-2 is a confidant in the NRW police force and is not allowed to answer these questions about the intelligence service methodology.

The reactions in the hall to these and other questions speak volumes. David Diehl from the Federal Chancellery visibly tense in his chair, looking tense at the representatives of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia when they should actually intervene. On the part of the governing parties, it is Volker Ullrich (CSU) who is audibly angry about Martina Renner's questions. There are also annoying, clearly perceptible murmurs from the ranks of the SPD.

Martina Renner does not let herself be unsettled. If Mr. Ullrich had dealt with the subject of V-Mann-beings as intensively as she has been doing for years, then it would be clear to him that there are no unfounded speculations with which she is offending on this evening, says Renner.

Unblackened

Martina Renner explains what can be concluded from the files of the OLG Celle on the Abu Walaa trial. Files that apparently contained only slightly blackened parts and reveal that at least four people trusted by the authorities were employed in the scene. The twelve meetings of the VP-01, at which information was provided, add up to 2,400 euros, according to Renner's experience. Tax free. Renner continues to confront.

The addressee is less the VPF-2 than the present representatives from government authorities. She poses the question of how, with such high levels of income, the activities of the confidants can still be brought into line with regulations about which only so much is known that the income must not become the main income of the informers.

Renner asks how it is possible that money from the authorities was used to set up a kind of front company in which the confidants were employed. She does not receive any answers, but the questions clarify the problems that the informers pose.

“All of these are empirical values ​​from the last few years,” Martina Renner makes clear. “When it comes to informants, there are always signs that the informal wages on offer create demand. This of course affects the quality of the information. Permanent alimony is prohibited in principle. If, however, a source provides the extent to which the VP-01 has been active for the authorities for over ten years, then that must be questioned. "

Rendezvous of the confidants

According to the documents of the OLG Celle, a total of four confidants had to do with the later assassin. However, only the VP-01 provided information. For the V-Mann-Fuehrer VPF-2 this was not a problem. Ultimately, the VP-01 was brought into use because of the special personal skills. Originally one only worked with VP-01 in the area of ​​organized crime.

Another suspicion is in the room that evening. Was there any involvement of a secret service - e.g. the Office for the Protection of the Constitution - when using the VP-01. This is unthinkable for the person of trust VPF-2. VPF-2: The term expresses that a person of trust always works with several persons of trust. In the case of the VP-01, a total of 3 trusted persons leaders were on duty. People took turns on vacation and illness. For his colleague, VPF-2 puts his hand in the fire that there was no cooperation with secret services.

There was also no duplication of the cell phone that the VP-01 had procured together with the later assassin.

Determined to act

At the end of 2015, when the later assassin appeared in jihadist circles in Germany, he caught the eye of the VP-01. At first there was a language barrier because the VP-01 does not speak Arabic, explains the VPF-2. The intention to commit an attack and the radicalism in appearance were immediately signs that one was dealing with a relevant threat. The VP-01 quickly established contact with the later assassin.

Trips by car from NRW to visit Abu Walaa in Hildesheim and support in buying a mobile phone are documented. At the latest, however, when it comes to services as a language mediator when dealing with authorities, the role of the VP-01 becomes clearly questionable, because the commitment meant that the later assassin received additional money.

There must also have been several crimes committed by the VP-01. Exact information on this is not possible in a public meeting, because it would enable the VP-01 to be exposed.

So unresolved that the question of the hen and the egg also remains the question of whether the VP-01 observed or promoted the radicalization of the assassin. The later assassin was increasingly embedded in an environment he could and should trust. An environment that could commit crimes, but did not experience any noteworthy penalties for it and was always equipped with funds and means of transport.

LKA Berlin


On that day, the committee also questioned the investigator of the LKA Berlin Criminal Superintendent G.K. to his perceptions along the case. G.K. first dealt with the case of the later assassin in 2015 and immediately recognized the explosiveness. Then 25 years old, G.K. For the first time, work on a case independently and lead the investigation. G.K. however, and asked not to be primarily responsible. His testimony is cooperative, open-minded and tries to answer the questions of the chairmen in the best possible way.

Similarly conscientious, G.K. the questioning of Bilel ben Ammar when he had to answer for a cell phone theft in February 2016. According to Irene Mihalic (Greens), around 23 pages of interrogation minutes were created in an exemplary manner: “I am slowly coming to the conclusion that he would have been better off taking the lead. Apparently his colleagues weren't as tidy and motivated as he was, ”tweeted Mihalic.

Right-wing extremists again and again

Irene Mihalic is amazed how the LKA Berlin carried out an evaluation of the cell phone stolen by ben Ammar, but did not pursue further investigative approaches after the evaluation. There were references to the radical right-wing scene on the cell phone. Messages that were signed with "Sieg Heilchen", as well as pictures of the imperial war flag, did not lead to any identifiable investigations.

More and more often, intersections between right-wing radicalism and jihadism are developing around the Breitscheidplatz attack. The most obvious ones already on the evening of the crime, when the criminal, right-wing populist and Pegidainitiatior Lutz Bachmann wanted to know about a Tunisian Muslim, but soon deleted his tweet about it. It is also noticeable that the murder weapon with which the assassin shot the truck driver comes from the same batch as a weapon of the NSU trio.

References to the assassins in Paris were also shown in the protocols with which the stewards were able to work. It is known that in France a member of the Identitarian Movement sold weapons to jihadists that were used in an attack in 2015.

Team Democratic Opposition

The questions of the ruling parties ended much earlier with the witness VPF-2 than was the case with the Berlin LKA witness. Konstantin von Notz (Greens) wonders how it can be that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution issued a certificate from the authorities, but neither questioned nor involved the relevant person of trust. The chairman of the committee, Klaus-Dieter Gröhler, intervened harshly, mocking the end of speaking time and allowing the right to ask questions to be switched to the FDP. Benjamin Strasser (FDP) continues seamlessly, thus preventing the pressure built up from fizzling out.

Strasser also wants to know why the LKA NRW clearly recognized the later assassin as a threat, but the Federal Criminal Police Office in the person of Chief Detective Rehkopf had "considerable doubts about the credibility" of the source information. VPF-2 attributes this to the fact that the study of files alone is not sufficient to assess the quality of the source information.

For the sake of completeness

The committee only deals with the witness Kriminalhauptkommissar K. from the LKA NRW for around sixty minutes. K. was on duty as part of the weekend readiness when the later assassin set out from Berlin to the German-Swiss border at the end of July 2016 in order to leave the country. Since the processing of the case was switched between LKA Berlin and LKA NRW at that time, the telephone surveillance of the later assassin was controlled from Berlin.

There, a senior public prosecutor decided on two scenarios. An exit to another European country could be carried out without any problems. An exit to Turkey, however, where a further journey to Syria was obvious, should have been prevented. The surveillance logs suggest that the later assassin wanted to return to Tunisia.

When he was picked up in Friedrichshafen, he was carrying two sets of Italian passport papers. However, the detention was short-lived. To the astonishment of the NRW officials and the later assassin, who left the police station enthusiastically.